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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
KEITH L. KNIGHT, d.b.a.
)
Knight Realty Company,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

No. 8623

vs.
ROSS H. CHAMBERLAIN,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDEN'T

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Keith L. Knight, dba Knight Realty Company,
commenced an action against Ross H. Chamberlain
alleging that Chamberlain had "employed Knight's
services to assemble options" in favor of Chamberlain on large tracts of land in Salt Lake County.
Knight alleged that the reasonable value of services
rendered was the sum of $3,450.00. At the conclusion
of plaintiff's evidence, a motion to dismiss was made
and the court, in granting defendant's motion to
dismiss, found that plaintiff's evidence showed that
1
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plaintiff was employed by defendant to obtain options granting to defendant the right, for a fixed
period, to purchase real property in Salt Lake County and, there being no written instrument evidencing the agreement, such employment contract alleged by appellant was void by virtue of the provision of section 25-5-4 ( 5) Utah Code Annotated '!1:
1953.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Essentially, the testimony of Mr. Knight, as
well as the exhibits attached, indicate that Mr.
Knight was asked by Mr. Chamberlain to obtain ,
options for the purchase of real property in Salt
Lake County [Tr. 92 and 93]. Mr. Knight answered
in the affirmative when asked the question whether
or not the bulk of his time was spent in obtaining
options on real property [Tr. 93]. Exhibit 10 indicates that of a total of twenty-two full days spent
in Chamberlain's service, over seventeen days was
spent in contacting land owners for the purpose
of obtaining options. The appellant testified that
Chamberlain stated he would pay Knight for his
services. However, the terms and conditions were
never discussed and Knight indicated that he never
mentioned to Chamberlain . how n1uch he would
charge per day or per hour for the service that he
had rendered [Tr. 93].
2
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POIN'T 1
THE NATURE OF THE SERVICE AND FOR
WHOM IT IS RENDERED DETERMINE WHETHER
OR NOT A CONTRACT EMPLOYING A REAL ESTATE
BROKER COMES WITHIN THE S T A T U T E OF
FRAUDS.
POINT II
EMPLOYMENT TO OBTAIN OPTIONS TO PURCHASE LAND COMES WITHIN THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS.

ARGUMEN'T
POINT 1
THE N~TURE OF THE SERVICE AND FOR
WHOM IT IS RENDERED DETERMINE WHETHER
OR NOT A CONTRACT EMPLOYING A REAL ESTATE
BROKER COMES WITHIN THE S T AT U T E OF
FRAUDS.

The appellant contends that the employment
of services to be paid for in the event there is not
a sale need not be in writing and maintains that
the agreement in question was not an agreement
for compensation for the purchase or sale of real
estate, but an agreement that no compensation need
be paid in the event a purchase or sale is consummated. Appellant concedes that an action in quantum meruit is not available to a broker who is employed to purchase or sell real estate where he fails
to put the agreement in writing, but he maintains
that where the employment is to render services
connected with land and not for the purchase or
3
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sale of land, a recovery for the reasonable value of
the service can be had even though there is no memorandum in writing. [Appellant's brief, page 13].
He cites several cases to support this proposition.
Respondent maintains that the nature of the broker's service and for whom it is rendered determines
whether or not a contract employing a broker comes
within the statute of frauds.
Certainly every agreement connected with land
does not come within the prohibition of the statute
of frauds. A review of the cases will indicate the
type of agreement the statute contemplates.
The case of Hall v. Rankin, 22 Ariz. 13, 193 P.
756 illustrates an agreement not contemplated by
the statute of frauds. In that case it was alleged the
defendant entered into the following agreement with
plaintiff:
"'I have been trying to sell the Henrietta
mine to the Big Ledge people, but the mine
must stand the inspection of Mr. Shockley,
their engineer. I have had a "racket" with
him and I cannot get them to go out and look
over the property. You know these people,
and I want you to get their engineer on
the ground, and if I get $150,000 for it I will
pay you $25,000 for your services, and if I
sell it for less I will pay you very liberally,
and in any event I will pay you for your
trouble and expense.' "
Appellant's brief contains a portion of the
court's opinion, but does not include the following
4
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language which is most important to clearly understand the reasoning upon which the decision was
based:
"In this case the plaintiff, as agent, undertook to perform for the defendant, who
was not the owner of the mine, certain services, and the defendant undertook to make
compensation therefor. The plaintiff was employed to get the engineer of the Big Ledge
Company-on the mine for the purpose of inspection; he was not em played to sell the mine
-that was the business of the defendant. The
only characteristic in the contract, indicating
that the employment of the plaintiff was to
sell real estate, is the stipulation that his
compensation for his services should be $25,000 if the defendant sold the mine for $150,000, and if the mine was sold for a less amount
that the plaintiff should be paid liberally. We
think that this provision should be construed
as fixing merely the 'measure' of the plaintiff's compensation and not that it is to be
considered as one of the terms of a con tract
for the sale of the mine."
A similar case is the Oregon case of Clark v.
Opp, 156 Ore. 197, 66 P. 2nd 1179. In that case

the plaintiff was employed to go upon certain mining property and tunnel, timber and develop the
property and to expose and sample the ore bodies
so that the mine could be exhibited to a prospective
lessee. In the Clark case it is evident that the plaintiff was employed not to sell the property but as indicated, to develop the property so that it could be
5
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sold. The Clark case and the Hall case illustrate an
agreement which contemplates a service not embracing the purchase or sale of real property.
It is important in examing the broker's agreement to determine whether or not the broker is dealing with another real estate broker or agent, or is
dealing or contracting with a prospective purchaser
or seller of real property. The California case of
Howard v. D. W. Hobson Company, 176 P. 2nd '
715 is illustrative of- a fact situation involving
two real estate brokers engaged in a joint venture. In that case, the plaintiff informed representatives of the defendant company that he could
obtain an option to purchase property belonging to
a Mrs. Moore for the sum of $25,000.00. Representatives of the defendant company agreed with the
plaintiff that if he could secure the option, defendant would endeavor to sell the land and would divide any sums in excess· of the option price of $25,000.00, received pursuant to said sale. The defendant raised the question of the statute of frauds
alleging that the employment agreement was oral.
The court stated:
"That we may go further and hold that
even if it were necessary to concede that the
agreement in question in effect involved the
employment of the plaintiff to purchase the
Moore property for the defendant, still, since
said agreement was between real estate brokers and not between a broker and the owner
6
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of land, it was not necessary to n1ake it valid
that it should have conformed to the formalities prescribed by subdivision 6 of Section
1624 of the Civil Code."
On rehearing the Supreme Court of California
said:
"PER CURIAM. The application for a
hearing in this court after decision in the
District Court of Appeal of the Third Appellate District is denied.
In denying the application, vve deem it
proper to say that we are not prepared to hoJ4
that subdivision 6 of section 1624 of the Civil
Code is not applicable in the case of a simple
con tract between a real estate agent or broker
and a proposed purchaser to obtain an option
for the purchase of real estate by the purchaser. The opinion clearly shows that this was in
substance a joint venture on the part of plaintiff and defendant for the sale of real property of a third party and the distribution of
the profits betv;een them. The District Court
of Appeal was clearly right in concluding
that subdivision 6 of section 1624 of the Civil
Code does not extend to agreements between
brokers to co-operate in making sales for the
sake of the commission or profits and that
this was substantially such a case."
In Arbuckel v. Clifford F. Reid, Inc., 118 Cal.
App. 272, -4, P. 2nd 978, the defendant corporation
was a company engaged in the business of subdividing and improving tracts of real estate in the county
of Los Angeles and employed two hundred salesmen
for selling the properties subdivided. The defendant
7
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_employed the plaintiff as director of sales and manager of real estate salesmen and agreed to pay plain- .
tiff for his service a certain sum based on coramissions received from sales concluded by the sales- '
men of the corporation. The Court, in regard to the
employment contract, stated:
"This contract, as we view it, is not the
kind of contract or agreement to which reference is made by said section 1624. It contains
no authorization to respondent to either purchase or sell the property of appellant, but,
on the contrary, simply makes him the business manager of appellant for the purpose of
aiding and assisting its salesman in disposing of its lands. As was said in the case of
Pettibone v. Lake View Town Co., 134 Cal.
227, 66 P. 218, 219, in holding that said section 1624 had no application, 'The contract
here involved is for the personal services of
the plaintiff,' and so in the case at bar the
compensation or commission agreed to be paid
was in lieu of salary or wages for the personal services to be performed by respondent."
The Utah case of Andersen v. Johnson, 108
Utah 417, 160 P. 2nd 725 involved an action between
a real estate broker and his agent. In that case, the
defendant employed the plaintiff to obtain listings
on property in Box Elder County and defendant
agreed that in the event any of the land caused
to be listed by plaintiff with defendant was sold the
defendant would pay plaintiff one-third of the commission realized. The court held that the contract
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was one of employment and did not involve any
right or interest in land. The court stated that:
"'The contention of respondent that plaintiff cannot recover because his agreement was
oral is untenable. The con tract was one of
employment and not involving any right or
interest in land. See Johnson v. Allen, Utah
1945, 158 P. 2d 134. The proposition that a
contract for fee or commission may be recovered by agent from broker though not in writing is upheld in Arbuckle v. Clifford F. Reid,
Inc., 1931. 118 Cal. App. 272, 4 P. 2d 978;

"
Having considered certain employment agreelnents and relationships not contemplated by the
statute of frauds, consideration is now given to
agreements and relationships various courts hold to
be within the statute. In appellant's brief at page
20 the following statement appears:
"Thus it appears that specific employment to purchase or sell or to bind the principal is a necessary part of the employment of
a broker in order to comply with the statute
of frauds. Conversely, if the employment does
not authorize the purchase or sale and does
not authorize the agent to bind the principal
there is no employment for the purchase or
sale of real estate and the statute of frauds
is not applicable at all."
We cannot agree with appellant's position. The
statute of frauds pertaining to brokers does not
contemplate a situation where a broker is authorized to execute a conveyance of real property for a
9
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seller or enter in to a written con tract binding his
principal to purchase real property. Rather, the
statute contemplates the employment of a broker to
render services in connection with the procurement ,
by a broker of a bound seller or purchaser of real
property. The Supreme Court of California, in the
case of Shanklin v. Hall, 100 Cal. 26, 34 Pac. 636,
commenting on a statute similar to our own stated:
". . . Among the con tracts declared invalid, if not in writing, etc., by section 1624
of the Civil Code is: "6. An agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation or
a commission." The contract set out in the
complaint is embraced in the findings of the
court which we have quoted, and it appears
to possess all the elements essential to bring it
within the purview of the statute. It is not
necessary in the sense of the statute that he
should have been authorized to execute a conveyance of defendant's real property. Bouv.
Law Diet. "The duty assumed by a broker
is to bring the minds of the buyer and seller
to an agreement for a sale, and the price and
terms on which it is to be made." . . ."
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in
Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 18-1 P. 2d 335, said
in reference to our statute:
" ... It is different with the statute on
broker's agreements. It proYides that any
agreen1en t for the perforn1ance of services
as a real estate broker shall be void unless in
writing. The statute is as applicable to contracts implied in law as any other. In effect
10
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it forbids any recovery for services in selling
land which are are not provided for by written agreement. See also Page on the Law
of Contracts, Sec. 1413."
The purpose of our statute of frauds relating
' to broker agreements is to require a written contract
of employn1ent between a broker and a purchaser
or seller of real property. Where a principal wishes
to sell real property it is not necessary that the land
the principal desires the broker to sell be described
with particularity. This issue was raised and decided
in Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P. 2nd 134.
In that case the defendant alleged that the listing
agreer.aent did not contain an adequate description of
real property. In answering this contention, the
court said:
"Sec. 33-5-4 (5), U.C.A. 1943, expressly provides that "Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to
purchase or sell real estate for compensation"
shall be void unless some "note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the
party to be charged." The construction of
this section as to the sufficiency of a description of the real estate is apparently a matter
of first impression in this state. The section
is almost identical to Sec. 1624 ( 6) of the
California Civil Code. In an early case the
Supreme Court of California in construing
this provision noted that its chief element was
the employment. Toomy v. Dunphy, 86 Cal.
639, 25 P. 130. The provision has subsequently been before the California courts many
times. Many of the cases are cited in Pray v.
11
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Anthony, 96 Cal. App. 772, 27 4 P. 1024, 1026, ·~
wherein the court noted that; "As uniformly
held by numerous decisions in this state upon
the subject, the essential part of a contract
to employ a real estate broker, so far as the
statute of frauds is concerned, is the matter
of the employment and consequently need not
describe the land specifically if the terms of
the employment can be made definite without
it. The description of the land and its identity
are only incidental to the main purpose of the
contract, and, since contracts of that nature
do not purport to involve the title or right of
possession of land, much greater liberality is
allowed in construing and curing defective
descriptions therein than in cases of executory contracts to convey land or in deeds of
grant, for, as stated, so far as the statute of
frauds is concerned, the terms of the employment are the essential parts. The well-established rule is, therefore, that broker's contracts are not to be declared void merely because of a defect, uncertainty or ambiguity
in the description of the property to be sold,
when such defect can be cured by allagations
and proof of extrinsic facts or circun1stances."
This doctrine was approved by the Supreme
Court in Needham v. Abbot Kinney Co., 217
Cal. 72, 17 P. 2d 109."
In many situations a purchaser employing a
broker does not know exactly what property he
wishes to purchase and consequently a property description could not be included in an employment
contract, nor does the statute require a land description.
The statute of frauds relating to brokers agree12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ments deals with an employment contract as stated
in Johnson v. Allen; supra.
"The contention that the contract was
void because of the fact that the wife, who
under Idaho community property law was a
part owner of the land, did not sign the contract is based on a statute relating solely to
transfers or contracts to transfer an interest
in the land itself. This was a contract of employment and did not purport to convey an
interest in land. The defendant, by this contract, employed the plaintiff to find a purchaser for certain lands. When plaintiff did
the work he was entitled to the commission
agreed upon whether the land was sold or not,
whether defendant owned the land or not. No
case has been cited and we have found none
holding that such a listing contract is void
unless signed by the wife. The Utah Statute
of Frauds does not require that such a contract be signed by the "owner" of the lands
listed, but only that it be signed "by the party
to be charged." Defendant employed plaintiff
to do certain work by a valid written contract. Plaintiff did the work and is entitled
to the agreed compensation."
The Utah case of Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243,
188 P. 2nd 640, sets forth the type of service contemplated by the statute and the terms and conditions required to be in writing :
" 'The courts generally hold that under
such a statute a real estate broker or agent
cannot recover commission for services rendered in either selling or procuring a purchaser for real property unless it appears:
( 1) That there is an express con tract or
13
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agreement of authority in which the terms
and conditions of his employment, if any, and
the amount of his commission, etc., are stated;
(2) that such contract be in writing; (3)
that in the absence of such an express con..
tract no recovery can be had for the reasonable value of the services rendered as upon
a quantum meruit, nor for the money and
time expended for the use and benefit of the
owner of the property.' "
We wish to emphasize that a real estate broker
in order to recover compensation for services rendered in procuring a seller of real property, must
produce a written agreement setting forth the terms
and conditions of his employment and the amount
of his compensation, not the terms and conditions
of his authority to bind his principal.
Having considered that the function of a brokis primarily to bring about a purchase or sale of
real property by bringing a purchaser and seller
to an agreement regarding an exchange or sale of
real property and haYing discussed cases indicating
that such an employment contract must be in writing, let us next consider the meaning of the statutory term "purchase or sale". Several California
cases have construed this term. In DuckH'otth v.
Schumacher, 135 Cal. App. 661, 27 P. 2nd 919, according to the complaint, the plaintiff \vas to assist
and aid the defendant in laying out for subdivision and
subdividing for sale certain lands of the defendant
and to act as defendant's general sales n1anager in
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charge of the advertising of said subdivision and devising ways and means of promoting the sale of said
tract and superintending the sale thereof at a stated
salary per week. The defendant-appellant contended
that by the very terms of the contract it fell squarely
within the provisions of the California statute of
frauds which provided that an agreement employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate
for compensation is invalid unless in writing. The
Court stated:
" ... Stating the proposition otherwise,
the plaintiff was to aid and assist the defendant in the preliminary work of laying out a
subdivision and subdividing a certain tract
of land owned by the defendant; to plan and
carry out an advertising promotional scheme
looking to the sale of the land; to act as sales
manager; superintend the sale of said tract.
the contract in its entirety looked to the sale
of said tract through the agency of said plaintiff and by the means conceived and devised
by the plaintiff, all to the end that defendant
might sell his said tract through the medium
of and by the activities of the plaintiff. Such
employment, therefore, had for its sole object
and purpose the sale of the real property, and
such an employment is within the inhibition
of section 1624 of the Civil Code. To hold
otherwise would give rise to a practice of ingenious forms, without substances in fact,
and thus avoid the very salutary rule of law
as declared in section 1624 of the Civil Code,
and open the door to fraud, long closed by said
statute, and would in effect abrogate such
15
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statute of frauds ( Civ. Code, Sec. 1624 ...
If one assists either in the purchase or sale
o~ real estate on a contract for compensation
~1ther by commission or salary, he falls withIn the inhibitions provided in said section to
the same extent and in the same manner as
though he had been the sole and exclusive medium through which the purchase or sale was
made. We think that the terms "employed to
sell or purchase" should and does include to
aid and assist in the purchase or sale, and it
seems to us that to state otherwise would be
equivalent to saying that the whole does not
include all of its parts. Shanklin v. Hall, supra; Dolan v. O'Toole, supra. Measured by
this standard, all the testimony in the record
shows that plaintiff was to aid and assist
defendant in the sale of real estate, and such
was the purpose of his employment. The evidence, therefore, was insufficient to support
the findings of the court and the judgment,
there being no evidence that the contract was
in writing, that the contract was of such a
nature as to require it to be in \vriting or
some note or memorandum thereof in writing
and signed by the party to be charged.
The judgment is reversed."
Appellant in his brief has referred to the case
of OU'cn v. National Container Corp of California,
115 Cal. App. 2nd 21, 251 P. 2nd 765. In that case the
plaintiff alleged that defendants employed plaintiff
to locate a suitable industrial site in Los Angeles;
that the plaintiff \Yas to develop surveys for defendant on labor conditions, transportation matters, fi16
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nancial arrangements and further, plaintiff was to
negotiate and assist defendants in the preparation of
engineering drawings on various proposed factory
layouts and further to negotiate on behalf of defendants with the Federal Manufacturing District, Inc.,
of Los Angeles, respecting the proposed plant to be
constructed by defendants in that District. The lower
court dismissed the complaint and on appeal the
appellate court held that an employment of a broker
to negotiate and assist a third party in effecting a
purchase of real property for compensation would
be invalid unless in writing. The court went on to
say:
"An employment of plaintiff merely tq
give defendants information as to available
factory sites would not have to be in writing.
Wilson v. Morton, 85 Cal. 598, 24 P. 784. An
employment of plaintiff "to locate a suitable
industrial site," without any duty on his part
to bring the parties together or to negotiate
or assist in a purchase would not be an employment to purchase real property . . ."
" ... Plaintiff has pleaded a most unusual
agreement under which he was to locate a site
but not negotiate for or otherwise assist in its
purchase . . ."
"We may say, however, in conclusion,
that if the court should find that the services
alleged were merely incidental to plain tiff's
efforts to bring about a sale of real property
to defendant, and that there was no express
agreement of defendant to pay for the same,
17
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plaintiff cannot prevail in this action, either
upon contract or in quantum meruit."
And finally we refer to the case of PacificSouthwest Dev. Corp. v. Western Pac. R. Co., 301 P.
2nd 825. In that case the plaintiff contended that
an agreement authorizing or employing a broker
to obtain an option to purchase real property did
not come within the statute of frauds. The court
held that in California an option to purchase real
property had been held to come within the statute
of frauds and must be in writing, and further
stated:
"In determining the nature of the services which will bring an employment contract
within the statute, the phrase" to sell or purhcase" includes "to aid or assist in the purhcase or sale" of real estate. Hooper v. Mayfield, 114 Cal. App. 2d 802, 806, 251 P. 2d
330; Duckworth v. Schumacher, 135 Cal. App.
661, 666, 27 P. 2d 919. Such broad construction of the term conforms \Yith one of the
primary purposes of the statute, the protection of real estate owners from the assertion
of false claims by brokers and agents. Toomy
v. Dnnphy, 86 Cal. 639, 642, 25 P. 130; also
Gorham v. Heiman, 90 Cal. 346, 27 P. 289;
Hooper z·. llfayficld, supra, 114 Cal. App. _2d
330. Likewise, the procurement of an option
agreement for the purchase of real property
is a contract that aids or assists in the purchase or sale of real property, and properly
comt"'s \vithin the provisions of the statute.
Accordingly, a contract employing a broker
to obtain an option for the purchase of real
18
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property, like a con tract em playing a broker
.to purchase or sell real property, Steiner v.
Rowley, 35 Cal. 2d 713, 717, 221 P. 2d 9;
Marks v. Walter G. McCarty Corp., supra,
comes within the statute and must be in writing. To hold otherwise would open the door
to the assertion of unfounded claims by brokers and others on the pretense of oral employment in real estate transactions relative to
options, and so frustrate the purpose of the
statute.
In the instant case the appellant was dealing
with a prospective purchaser of real property. His
evidence indicates that the majority of his time was
spent in contacting the owners of real property to
obtain from them an option to purchase property. We think that all of his efforts were calculated to effectuate and to bring about a sale of real
property and consequently because there is no agreement of employment in writing he is not entitled
to recover for the service rendered.
POINT II
EMPLOYMENT TO OBTAIN OPTIONS TO PURCHASE LAND COMES WITHIN 'THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS.

The authorities are divided on this problem.
The appellant has cited cases which hold that the
employment of a broker to obtain options to purchase land does not come within the statute of
frauds. The courts that so hold reason that an option
, is not a sale nor an agreement to sell; that it is
r.
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simply a contract by which the owner of property
agrees with another than he shall have the right to
buy his property at a fixed price within a time
certain. They reason that an owner does not sell his
land, that he does not then agree to sell it; but that
all he sells is the right or privilege to buy at the
election or option of the other party. The second
party gets in praesenti, not land, or an agreement
that he shall have land, but he does get something of
value, i.e., the right to call for and receive land, if
he elects.
Corbin, in his work on contracts, maintains
that options to buy lands are contracts and that
options to purchase create an interest in the land. In
volume 2 of Corbin on Contracts at pages 438, 439,
and 441, the following statements appear:
"If a broker is employed to procure an
option on land, the contract would seem to be
within the statute unless the statute clearly
distinguishes between conditional and unconditional contracts. In obtaining an option, the
employer desires and gets a contract right to
a conveyance of land, even though it is subject to a condition that he is not bound to perform . . . .
"It is clear from all this that a binding
option is a conditional contract for the future
conveyance of land. It is usually a unilateral
con tract, by Yirtue of a seal or some execu~d
consideration; but it may be bilateral, as m
the case of a lease \Vith option to buy, in
which the consideration is a return promise
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by the lessee to pay rent. Probably _it is the
unilateral character of most options that is
the chief reason for confusion, for many have
been very slow to grasp the nature of a unilateral con tract; but an additional reason is
found in the fact that the holder's right is
subject to a condition precedent, and many
have erroneously asserted that until the condition is performed there is no contract....
"If a reasonable interpretation of the
statute shows that it was intended to apply
to all cases in which the broker is employed
to negotiate a contract for the purchase and
sale of land, including unilateral and conditional contracts, then it should have been held
applicable in the Oregon case. The question
whether an option contract in itself creates
an interest in the land is considered in another section. . . .''
It would seem that a reasonable interpretation
of our statute would show that it was intended to
apply to all cases where a broker is employed to
negotiate a contract for the purchase and sale of
land, including unilateral and conditional contracts.
Certainly, the activities of the broker in both
situations are the same. To hold that a broker
employed to obtain options does not come within
the provisions of the statute of frauds would open
the door to the assertion of unfounded claims by
brokers and others in real estate transactions and
frustrate the purpose of the statute.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The appellant's argument may be summarized,~
as follows :
.

Because the appellant was not authorized
to purchase any land for the respondent and was
given no authority to bind the respondent in any
particular, there was no employment for the purchase or sale of real estate and where the employment is to render services connected with land only,
and not for the purchase or sale of land, recovery.
for the reasonable value of services can be had even
though there is no memorandum in writing.
1.

2. Employment to obtain options to buy land
is not within the statute of frauds.
Care should be exercised to determine the nature of the employment contract. For example, if
a broker employs an agent to obtain listings on property so as to enable the broker to sell property
this clearly is not within the statute. If two brokers
undertake a joint venture for their mutual advantage, this has been held not to come within the
statue. However, where a broker is dealing with
a third party, the authorities state that service rendered by a broker which aids or assists his principal
to purchase or sell real estate comes within the
terms of the statute.
We think that the services performed by the
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appellant in this case were calculated to bring about
a sale of real property to the plaintiff. We reject
appellant's contention that because he was not authorized to bind the defendant there was no employment for the purchase or sale of real property. A
broker's task is to bring the minds of the buyer and
seller of property to an agreement concerning the
terms, conditions and sale of real property and not
to act as agent with a power of attorney to enter
into agreement binding his principal. Our courts
have held that under such a statute as ours, a real
estate broker or agent cannot recover compensation
for services rendered unless there is an express contract or agreement of employment in which the
terms and conditions of employment, if any, and
the amount of compensation are stated and that
such a contract must be in writing. Appellant testified that he would look to the seller of property for
his compensation in the event a sale was consumated, but in the event a sale was not concluded, it
was his understanding that respondent would pay
him ·for his services. If, as appellant contends
this particular situation takes the agreement out
of the statute of frauds, then it is entirely possible,
wherever real estate brokers have unsuccessfully
rendered services to prospective purchasers of property, for those brokers to commence actions based
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on oral agreements to recover in quantum meruit
for services rendered. We maintain that this is
the exact situation the statute of frauds seeks to
avoid.
Respectfully sumitted,
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT & MABEY
& 0. WEBSTER ADAMS

Attorneys for Respondent
801 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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